

C-II DOCS

Herry Rowen
8-23-62 Study

(see, 30 Aug : for Pres)

23 Aug 62 ISA Item 5 (in list by Bundy 4c6)

"Probable military, political, + psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of SAMs or SSMS which could reach the US."

1. Most probable present low missile activity would be introduction of SA-2's. ... have been introduced in Indonesia and ordered by UAR + Iraq....

Other missiles which could be introduced now or later are SSMS of ranges from 150 mi to 2000 mi of some of the low IRBMs. SSMS with a range greater than 700 miles would require relatively substantial installations [NO]; shorter range missiles are mobile + could be introduced very quickly without elaborate construction.

SSMS might also be introduced by use of Cuban ports by low missile carrying subs. Low missile force is greatly hindered by in op. for from home + near US by absence of a forward base such as we have at Holy Loch. Moreover, sub missiles could be kept under tighter low control than land-based.

2. Mil. Impact.

-- SAMs would make uson difficult & dangerous...

SSMs would constitute a very significant military

threat to the continental US. reduced warning...

Cuban SSMs would present

an immediate threat for which there is no easy answer.

It appears probable that on military grounds alone, the
establishment of such a capability would be unacceptable.

At a minimum we would probably have to adopt a large
scale and continuing SAC airborne alert.

[depends on numbers & "Nobody accepted this."]

3. Psych. impact of a low missile estab. in Cuba

(later deleted)

The ~~est~~ psych. impact of any ^{substantial} low-
_{miss} provided missile force would undoubtedly be great: in the
US, in Cuba itself, in the rest of the Western Hemisphere,
and in NATO. Yet it is possible that this impact would
be qualitatively different and much lighter if only SAMs were
involved.

The SC, in making a decision to supply the Cubans with missiles of any sort, is obviously staking a claim to a large-scale military foothold in the Western Hemisphere. This would be a major departure in US policy. On the other hand it can be argued that this claim was already stated when Migs were delivered a year ago. The arrival of the Migs did not cause great disturbance to American or Hemisphere opinion. Militarily, neither the Migs nor SAMs represents a decisive change. Yet the military problem of U.S. and possible attack grows progressively more difficult with each such addition to Cuban defensive strength.

Moreover, if the installations can be described persuasively as defensive in character, the difficulty of justifying a forceful US response is increased.

In sum, any missiles would have a substantial psych. impact, while SSMs would create a situation of substantial & justified alarm, even in absence of proof that nuc warheads were arriving with them. The arrival in the West. Hem.

of systems depending for their effectiveness on nuclear weapons [unlike I-85: hsr] would mark a very significant change in Sov policy bound to have worldwide effects. Outside of the US this move would be taken as a major step, signalling the arrival of a state of nuclear symmetry between the US & the SU. In addition it would be evidence of growing Comm. power in Latin Am. Domestically, there undoubtedly would be widespread concern at development of a new threat. Very likely there would be widespread domestic support for drastic counteraction.